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1. INTRODUCTION
A central issue in the economics of innovation is how patents aﬀect innovation incen-
tives. In the standard static framework for a single innovation (e.g., Gilbert and Shapiro,
1990; Klemperer, 1990; Gallini, 1992), stronger patent protection encourages innovation
by protecting the innovator’s profits against potential imitation, albeit it may cause static
monopoly distortion. A key feature of innovation, however, is that it is cumulative. For
example, current innovation in the biotechnology and software industries can be used as
a base of future improvement (Scotchmer, 2004). This consideration has led to the exam-
ination of patent policy in a two-stage innovation framework where a second innovation
builds upon the first (e.g., Green and Scotchmer, 1995; and Scotchmer, 1996).1 This ap-
proach emphasizes the division of profit between innovators, and argues that it is necessary
to transfer profit from follow-on to initial innovators in order to provide suﬃcient incen-
tives for the fundamental initial innovation. More recent advances in the literature have
addressed the issue of patent strength under continual innovation, recognizing that firms
may rotate their roles as past and current innovators over time. While several studies have
found that stronger patents further innovation by delaying the next patentable discovery
(e.g., O’Donoghue 1998; O’Donoghue et al, 1998; and Hunt, 2004),2 Segal and Whinston
(2007), focusing on profit division, demonstrates that increasing patent strength actually
reduces continual innovation due to a "front-loading" eﬀect.3 Thus, the important ques-
tion of how patents will impact continual innovation remains unsettled. In this paper, we
reconsider this issue more generally in a framework where the profit expansion and division
1See also Chang, 1995; Matutes, et al, 1996; Van Dijk, 1996; Denicolò, 2000; and Denicolò and Zanchettin,
2002.
2 In particular, O’Donoghue et al (1998) suggests granting leading breadth while O’Donoghue (1998)
proposes using a patentability requirement to stimulate R&D investment. Hunt (2004) shows the existence
of a unique patentability standard that maximizes the rate of innovation.
3An innovator benefits from the innovation immediately as an entrant but with a discount as the fu-
ture incumbent. Thus, stronger patent protection, which shifts innovation profit from the entrant to the
incumbent, reduces innovation incentive. Segal and Winston (2007) obtained this insight in the context of
antitrust policy, but it equally applies to patent protection, as discussed in Vickers (2010).
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eﬀects are both present, and investigate whether (when) stronger patents will lead to higher
or lower industry innovation.
We study a dynamic model of continual innovation that considers explicitly the inter-
actions between the two distinctive roles of patents: dividing profits between sequential
innovators and expanding profits from innovation by deterring imitation. Our stylized
economy consists of two potential innovating firms and a competitive fringe of imitators.
In each period one of the innovating firms is the incumbent, who, through innovation at
an earlier period can produce a product of a certain quality; whereas the other is the po-
tential entrant who, if successful in discovering a higher-quality product through R&D, will
enter the industry, replace the current incumbent, and becomes the new incumbent next
period. Stronger patent protection expands the profits of the innovators against imitators,
but also shifts profits from current to past innovators. The net impact of these two eﬀects
on continual innovation, as we shall demonstrate, varies with industry fundamentals.
To allow for more general analysis, we first consider a model with reduced-form payoﬀs for
various players, without specifying the functional forms of payoﬀs. In this general model, we
find that maximum patent protection is most conducive to innovation when the discount
factor is above a critical value; otherwise, the industry innovation rate is an inverted-U
function of patent strength. The intuition for this finding is the following: In industries
where discovery potentially occurs highly frequently (or the discount factor is suﬃciently
large), the frequent rotation of a firm’s role as an incumbent or an entrant under continual
innovation means that the profit division eﬀect is negligible, and it is the joint profit of the
innovators–past and present–that determines R&D incentives. Stronger patent protection
expands this joint profit at the expense of the imitators, thereby increasing innovation.
When the discount factor is not too high, however, the profit expansion eﬀect initially
dominates and is then dominated by the profit division eﬀect, so that some intermediate
level of patent protection, which increases in the discount factor, can properly balance the
two opposing eﬀects to provide the highest innovation incentive. Notice that our finding is in
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contrast to the result suggested by Segal and Whinston (2007) that stronger patents would
reduce innovation in innovative industries. This is due to their focus on the profit division
eﬀect whereas our analysis also incorporates the role of patents in expanding innovators’
profits against imitation.
We also show that when firms’ innovation capability is higher, stronger patent increases
innovation if it enlarges innovating firms’ net profit gain from a new discovery (in peri-
ods with or without entry), but it decreases innovation otherwise. Intuitively, when the
innovation capability is higher, new discovery (or success of the potential entrant) is more
likely, and hence to increase innovation incentive it is more desirable to have stronger patent
protection that would increase the joint profits of the innovating firms in the entry period
However, a higher innovation capability also raises the probability that the incumbent (the
past innovator) will be replaced, and hence enhanced protection which increases the profit
of the incumbent (in the period of no entry) is also less useful in encouraging innovation
Thus, whether stronger patents will encourage innovation under higher innovation capabil-
ity depends on how the net profit of the innovating firms from a new discovery varies with
patent protection. An immediate implication of this result is that patent protection need
not be higher in a country or an industry in which firms have higher innovation capabilities.
While previous studies have also suggested this possibility4, our analysis points to a new
mechanism for this possible outcome.
With additional assumptions that parameterize the model, we further find that increased
competition, in the sense of reduced horizontal product diﬀerentiation between the innovat-
ing and imitating firms, partially substitutes for patent protection in promoting innovation
when the discount factor is relatively small. When the discount factor is relatively large,
however, starting from relatively low intensity of competition, increasing competition inten-
sity is initially complementary to but eventually becomes partially substituting for patent
4For instance, Chen and Puttitanun (2005) find empirical evidence for a U-shaped relationship between
the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) and a country’s innovation capability (measured by its
leve of development).
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protection in stimulating innovation. We also derive new results on how innovation costs
may aﬀect patent protection: high marginal innovation cost tends to reduce the need for
strong patent strength, whereas high fixed innovation cost tends to require greater patent
protection. As we shall explain in detail, the intuition for these results can also be found
from considering the interactions between the profit expansion and division eﬀects.
In their recent book, Burk and Lemley (2009) commented that “...innovation works dif-
ferently in diﬀerent industries, and (that) the way patents aﬀect that innovation also diﬀers
enormously by industry. The question for patent policy is how to respond to these diﬀer-
ences.” (page 5). Our findings are in broad support of their views on the diﬀerent roles
patents may play in diﬀerent industries. We contribute to the debate on patent policy by
demonstrating in a formal model how the impacts of patents on innovation incentives may
vary systematically with industry characteristics, and by clarifying the underlying economic
forces that result in these variations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 formulates a general model with
reduced-form payoﬀs. Section 3 analyzes this model and establishes analytical results on
how innovation depends on patent strength and how their relationship varies with the
discount factor and firms’ innovation capability. Section 4 parametrizes the general model
with additional assumptions to investigate how competition from imitators and innovation
costs may interact with patent protection to aﬀect innovation. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a stylized model with discrete time and infinite horizon,  = 0 1 2 . The
economy consists of two potential innovating firms and a competitive fringe of imitators. In
each period one of the innovating firms is the “incumbent”  and the other is the “potential
entrant” .5 At period  the incumbent, through innovation at an earlier period can
5To simplify notations, we use the same  and  to denote the incumbents and potential entrants at
diﬀerent time periods. Also, for variables that are time invariant, we will drop the time variable 
5
produce a product that has quality 6 The competitive fringe of firms, who do not innovate
and merely imitate the incumbent0 product, produce a variety that has quality  ()  with
0 ()  0 where  ∈ [0 1] is the strength of patent protection. (Thus stronger patents
will lower the product quality of the imitating firms.) At the beginning of each period the
potential entrant chooses its R&D rate, or the probability of success,  ∈ [0 1]  where 
can be considered as an industry- or country- specific parameter that measures innovation
capability. Thus,  might be small in a mature industry or in a less developed country, but
large in a new industry or in a developed country. The R&D cost  () is twice diﬀerentiable
with 0 (·) ≥ 0 and 00 (·) ≥ 0. Without 0 entry,  will remain as the incumbent next
period. If  is successful, its new product, whose quality is ∆ above  0 product quality,
immediately replaces  0 product and will become the incumbent next period, whereas the
current incumbent will become the potential entrant next period.
For our main model, to allow for more general analysis, we make reduced-form assump-
tions about equilibrium profits in each period. Specifically, we assume that in a period
without entry, the incumbent’s profit is  ≡  () ; and in a period with the entry of 
the joint profit of  and  is Σ ≡ Σ ()  of which  receives  = Σ and  receives
 = (1− )Σ Thus stronger patent protection, in the sense of a higher  increases
the profit share of the current patent holder relative to the entrant (the new innovator).
The competitive fringe will always price at their marginal cost, which is normalized to
zero. We further assume that 0 ()  0 00 () ≤ 0; and 0Σ ()  0 00Σ () ≤ 0 with
0Σ (0) ≥ Σ (0)  Thus, the total profits of innovating firms (with or without entry) are
increasing and concave functions of patent strength, and the profit expansion eﬀect is not
too small when  = 0
After analyzing the main model, we shall parameterize it with additional functional spec-
ifications under which the reduced-form assumptions are satisfied and further comparative
static results are obtained.
6For  = 0 we assume  is able to produce a patentable product with value 0.
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3. ANALYSIS
We focus on stationary Markov perfect equilibria of the infinite-horizon game. Define 
as the expected present discounted profit of an incumbent, and  as that of a potential
entrant, both of which are evaluated at the beginning of a period. Consequently, we have:
 =  +  +  [ −  +  ( − )] , (1)
where  ∈ (0 1) is the discount factor. The first two terms in the right-hand side of (1)
denote the expected present discounted value if the incumbent is not replaced, while the
third term denotes the loss of the value if it is replaced.
Similarly, the expected present discounted profit that an entrant earns is given by:
 =  +  [ +  ( − )]−  () , (2)
where the first term in the right-hand side of (2) is the expected present discounted value
if the entrant does not innovate, while the second term is the gain of the value if it does.
Following Segal and Whinston (2007), we call  ≡ + ( − ) the innovation prize.7
Equation (2) implies that, given the innovation prize , the optimal R&D rate for entrant
 is
Φ () = arg max∈[01] { −  ()} . (3)
As in Segal and Whinston (2007), since  () is convex, Φ () is a continuous and increasing
function of  for all  ≥ 0 (0), whereas Φ () = 0 for   0 (0) 
From (1) and (2), we find
7This is also called the expected capital gain that results from making a patentable discovery in Hunt
(2004).
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 =  (1− ) + (1− ) (1−  + ) +  ()
2 Σ −  ()
(1− ) (1−  + 2) , (4)
 =  (1− ) +  (1− ) +  ()
2 Σ − (1−  + )  ()
(1− ) (1−  + 2) , (5)
and
 −  =  (2− 1)Σ + (1− ) +  ()
1−  + 2 . (6)
Substituting (6) into  =  +  ( − ) and utilizing  = (1− )Σ we obtain
 ( ) =  = (1− ) +  [Σ + (1− ) +  ()]
1−  + 2 . (7)
Then, given parameter values, the equilibrium innovation rate and innovation prize, (∗ ∗) 
solve (3) and (7), and we assume that such a solution exists.8 Since Φ () is increasing and
is independent of , whether strengthening patent protection is conducive or detrimental to
innovation depends on how it aﬀects the innovation prize, . If an increase in  shifts out
(or shifts in)  then stronger patents increase (or decrease) innovation. That is, stronger
patent protection stimulates (stifles) innovation if

 = −
(1− )Σ
1−  + 2| {z }
profit division
+
[(1− ) (1− ) + ]0Σ +  (1− )0
1−  + 2| {z }
profit expansion
≥ (≤) 0. (8)
The first term on the right-hand side of (8) is the profit division eﬀect of increasing 
on innovation (or on the innovation prize): stronger patent protection shifts profits from
the entrant (the new innovator) to the incumbent (the existing patent holder); and, since
8Following Segal and Whinston (2007), we can call the functions defined by (3) and (7) the innovation
supply function and the innovation benefit function, respectively. For comparative statics analysis, when
there are multiple equilibria, or multiple ∗ we assume that the largest ∗ prevails.
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the innovator benefits from the innovation as the entrant immediately but as the future
incumbent only with a discount, the profit division eﬀect negatively impacts innovation
incentives. This corresponds to the front-loading eﬀect in Segal and Winston (2007). The
second term on the right-hand side of (8) is the profit expansion eﬀect of increasing  on
innovation: stronger patent protection reduces imitation, increasing the joint profits of the
innovating firms both through the higher joint profits of the (past and present) innovating
firms in the period of entry and through the higher profit of the incumbent (the past
innovator) when there is no entry. Whether stronger patent protection promotes or hinders
innovation depends on the balance of these two eﬀects, either of which may dominate, as
we show below:
Proposition 1 There exists some ¯ ∈ (0 1) such that (i) when   ¯   0; (ii) when
 ∈ £0 ¯¤, there is a unique ∗ () so that  R 0 for  Q ∗ ()  and ∗ () increases in
.
Proof. See the appendix.
An innovator is rewarded both immediately as the entrant and with a discount as the
future incumbent. The division of profits aﬀects how the innovation benefits are divided
between these two distinctive roles of the innovator; and, by shifting profits away from the
entrant to the incumbent, the profit division eﬀect of patent protection impacts negatively
on innovation incentive. However, as  → 1, the profit division eﬀect goes to zero, since
the innovator’s gain as the future incumbent is little discounted. Consequently, the profit
expansion eﬀect of increasing , which increases the joint profits of the entrant and the
incumbent, must dominate. This suggests that in industries where technology replacements
occur suﬃciently frequently (i.e.,  is suﬃciently high), stronger patent protection tends to
increase innovation.9
9The profit expansion eﬀect, which is not present in Segal and Winston (2007), explains why we reverse
their finding that a policy shifting profits to the incumbent reduces innovation. Our result also diﬀers
from Bessen and Maskin’s (2009) finding that imitation promotes innovation in industries where technol-
9
For  not too large ( ≤ ¯), the profit division eﬀect becomes significant. The assumption
that the profits of the innovating firms– () and Σ ()–are concave together with the
initial condition that 0Σ (0)  Σ (0)  ensures that the profit expansion eﬀect will dominate
when  is small, but the profit division eﬀect will dominates when  is large. Consequently,
innovation incentives rise initially but fall eventually with  or exhibiting an inverted-U
relationship with patent strength.
We next investigate how the innovation capability () of an industry or a country impacts
patent policies. For this purpose, suppose that the patent protection that maximizes the
innovation prize, ∗ is interior, so that 
¯¯
=∗ = 0. Then, from (8), we have
2

¯¯¯¯
=∗
=
 (0Σ − 0)
2−  + 1  (9)
which immediately implies:10
Proposition 2 A marginal increase in  raises ∗ if 0Σ ≥ 0 but lowers ∗ if 0Σ  0.
A higher innovation capability () makes new discovery (or success of the potential en-
trant) more likely, and hence to increase innovation incentive it is more desirable to have
a higher  that would increase the profits of the innovating firms when there is entry
(i.e., 0Σ  0) However, a higher  also raises the probability that the incumbent will be
replaced, and hence a higher  which increases the profit of the incumbent (the past in-
novator) (0  0) also becomes less useful in encouraging innovation Thus, whether a
higher innovation capability raises or lowers ∗ depends on the sign of 0Σ−0 or how the
net profit of the innovating firms (both  and ) from a new discovery varies with patent
protection.
Our results can shed light on policy discussions concerning patents, and more broadly,
ogy replacements occur frequently–they assume that innovation is sequential and complementary, so that
imitation provides complementary elements for the subsequent innovation.
10Note that a change in  also shifts Φ () defined in (3), but the  that maximizes innovation prize ()
will still result in the highest equilibrium innovation rate, ∗
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IPRs. It has been argued that only developed countries benefit from strong IPRs protection
(e.g., Chin and Grossman, 1990; Helpman, 1993), and evidence from cross-country studies
suggests that the positive eﬀect of patents on innovation is stronger in developed than
in developing countries (e.g., Park and Ginarte, 1997; Park, 2005; and Qian, 2007). To
the extent that developed countries conduct most innovations and hence also have more
frequent innovations, our Proposition 1 is consistent with these arguments and evidence.
However, our findings in Propositions 1 and 2 also caution that the relations between IPRs
and innovation can be more complex across countries. Developing countries may also have
innovations in certain industries, as Chen and Puttitanun (2005) argue and find evidence
for. Even though their innovation frequencies or innovation capabilities may be relatively
low, stronger patent protection can also stimulate innovation in developing countries, as
Proposition 1 suggests. Furthermore, a higher innovation capability in a more developed
economy does not always mean that it should have stronger patent protection to stimulate
innovation; the key consideration, rather, is how the net profit of the innovating firms from
a new technology may vary with patent protection.
4. FURTHER ANALYSIS
We next examine additional comparative statics to explore how competition from imi-
tators and innovation costs interact with patent protection to aﬀect innovation incentives.
Specifically, we are interested in the following two questions: (1) To stimulate innovation,
should patent protection be stronger or weaker when there is more intense competition from
the imitators due to reduced product diﬀerentiation. In other words, are competition and
patent protection complements or substitutes in promoting innovation? (2) How will the
nature of innovation cost, the relative importance of fixed and variable costs for innovation,
aﬀect the choice of patent protection? To address these questions, we parameterize the
main model by assuming the following: Consumers are uniformly distributed on a Hotelling
11
line with  ∈ [0 1]  Each consumer’s value for a product is equal to the product’s quality,
and a consumer’s unit transportation cost is   Firm  and firm  when there is entry, are
located at  = 0 whereas the competitive fringe of (imitating) firms are located at  = 1.
Following Green and Scotchmer (1995) and O’Donoghue et al (1998), we assume that 0
product will infringe  0 patent, which results in  immediately licensing its patent to 
The licensing agreement is such that  will receive  portion of the profit from 0 new
product in the period of entry.11 The competitive fringe’s product quality in period  is
 () ≡ −  (), with  (0) ≥ 0 0 ()  0, and 00 () ≤ 0. We assume that 0 ≥  (1)+ 32
to ensure consumers will always purchase in equilibrium. For convenience, we also assume
 = 1 for the rest of the analysis.
In a period without entry, given  0 price  the marginal consumer indiﬀerent between
purchasing from  and the competitive fringe is either at  = 1 or solves
 − −  =  −  ()− 0−  (1− ) 
 0 equilibrium price  maximizes 
³−+()+
2
´
if −+()+2  1, and otherwise 
equals to  ()−   That is,  0 equilibrium price and profit are respectively
 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
()+
2   () ≤ 3
 ()−    ()  3
;  =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[()+ ]2
8   () ≤ 3
 ()−    ()  3

Similarly, in a period with entry, the equilibrium price of  and the joint profits of  and
 are respectively
 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
()+∆+
2   +∆ ≤ 3
 () +∆−    +∆  3
; Σ =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[()+∆+ ]2
8   +∆ ≤ 3
 () +∆−    +∆  3

11Our analysis will be qualitatively the same if the new product infringes the patent rights of the existing
product only with some probability.
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For convenience, we focus on situations where consumer heterogeneity is not too high, or
3   ()+∆ Then, there are two cases: (1) 3   ()  corresponding to situations where
product diﬀerentiation (or consumer heterogeneity) is relatively small, so that all consumers
will purchase from the innovating firms in equilibrium; and (2)  () ≤ 3   () + ∆,
corresponding to situations where the degree of product diﬀerentiation (or consumer het-
erogeneity) is relatively high (but not too high), so that some consumers will also purchase
from the competitive fringe in equilibrium during periods without entry12 Recall that the
patent strength that maximizes the innovation prize () is denoted as ∗ which is assumed
to be interior for the rest of the analysis.
Proposition 3 When 3   ()  ∗ increases in  ; and when  ()  3   () +∆, ∗
increases in  if  ≤ 1 ≡ 44+3(1−)0() but decreases in  if  ≥ 2 ≡ 4
2
42+(1−)(3−∆)0() 
Proof. See the appendix.
An increase in  indicates less severe competition from the competitive fringe. Our result
suggests that the eﬀects of competition intensity on IPRs and innovation can be rather
subtle: they are in general non-monotonic, and may depend on other factors such as the
frequency of innovation in an industry. Specifically, if the discount factor is relatively
small ( ≤ 1) increasing competition, in the sense of reducing   always lowers ∗. In
other words, more competition can partially substitute for patent protection in providing
innovation incentives. However, if  is high enough ( ≥ 2) then starting from relatively
low intensity of competition ( ()  3), increasing competition initially raises ∗ but
eventually lowers ∗ (when  ()  3) That is, more competition is complementary to
patent protection at relatively low competition intensity but becomes partially substituting
for patent protection at relatively high competition intensity.
Intuitively, under our functional assumptions, the profit-division eﬀect is always decreas-
ing in   while the profit expansion eﬀect is decreasing in  for large  but independent of
12Notice that 0  0 and 0Σ  0 under the assumption 0 ()  0 and, if  () = √ we also have
00  0 and 00Σ  0 with 0Σ (0)  Σ (0).
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 for small  13 When  is relatively small, the negative profit division eﬀect is relatively
large and dominates. Hence a lower  enlarges the profit division eﬀect and lowers ∗.
When  is large, the negative profit division eﬀect becomes small, so the profit expansion
eﬀect dominates when  is large and a marginal decrease in  raises ∗; but as  further
decreases, eventually the profit expansion eﬀect becomes independent of   in which case
the profit division eﬀect dominates (even though it is small), leading to a lower ∗ for a
marginal reduction in  
There has been an extensive economics literature on how product market competition
aﬀects innovation.14 We depart from this literature by considering competition from im-
itating firms and how it interacts with patent strength to aﬀect innovation. Competition
from the imitators aﬀects R&D incentives not only directly, but also indirectly by altering
the balance of the profit expansion and division eﬀects of patent strength on innovation.
Next, we consider how innovation cost may aﬀect the patent protection that maximizes
innovation incentive. For this purpose, we specify the functional form of innovation cost
as  () = 12 2 + , where  is the fixed cost.15 Up to this point, we have focused on
how changes in  shifts the “innovation benefit” function defined by (7). Now, in order to
evaluate the eﬀects of innovation costs, we explicitly combine the innovation benefit function
with the “innovation supply” function, defined by (3), to solve the equilibrium innovation
rate ∗ which satisfies16
1 = [1− ] + 
£Σ + (1− ) + 12 2 +¤
1−  + 2 . (10)
13When  is small (3   ()), all consumers will purchase from the innovating firms. Thus, a marginal
change in  has no impact on the profit expansion eﬀect
14Aghion et al. (2005), which discusses and builds on this literature, finds that the relationship between
product market competition (PMC) and innovation is an inverted U-shape: inceasing competition initially
stimulates innovation but hinders innovation at higher levels of competition.
15Our qualitative results will hold under the alternative asumption that  () = 1 + for   0
16The second-order condition will be satisfied if either the discounted factor or the fixed cost is large.
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Denote the innovation-maximizing  by ∗ The proposition below assumes
00 ()
0 () ≤
8 (1− )  − 0 ()
4 ( + 1− ) (11)
at  = ∗ which holds if  () is suﬃciently concave.17
Proposition 4 Assume that (11) holds at  = ∗ Then, a marginal increase in 1 weakly
lowers ∗ while a marginal increase in  weakly raises ∗.
Proof. See the appendix.
Therefore, the innovation-maximizing patent strength tends to be higher in industries
with higher fixed and/or lower marginal innovation cost. One way to see the intuition for
Proposition 4 is the following. Holding all else constant, as the innovation probability ()
becomes higher, the profit expansion eﬀect becomes more important relative to the profit
division eﬀect, as can be seen from (8) where the ratio of the second term to the first term
rises with  On the other hand, the equilibrium innovation rate (∗) tends to decrease in
marginal innovation cost (1) but to increase in fixed cost (), as can be determined from
the equilibrium condition for ∗ equation (10). Therefore, an increase in or a decrease in
1 tends to raise ∗ which enhances the relative importance of the profit expansion eﬀect,
leading to a higher ∗
Innovation costs diﬀer across industries. One stylized fact presented by Burk and Lemley
(2009) is that patent protection is critical to innovation in pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries where the fixed cost of R&D is substantial, whereas it plays an insignificant role
in information industry that appears to have relatively low fixed but high marginal cost of
R&D. Our result is consistent with this empirical observation.
17Condition (11) is satisfied for all , for instance, if  () = √
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has conducted a new analysis of patent policy in a framework of continual
innovation. Greater patent strength expands the profit of the innovating firms against
imitation, but also shifts profit from current to past innovators. While these two eﬀects
have been considered in various contexts in the literature, our approach allows us to combine
them in a single model, to see their interactions clearly, and to show how their trade oﬀ
depends on factors including the frequency, capability, and cost of innovation, as well as the
competitive pressure from imitation.
By holding other things constant, we are able to identify and evaluate the impacts of
individual industry characteristics on the relationship between innovation and patents. It
is important to note, however, that the eﬀects of patents on innovation in a particular
industry are often determined jointly by several factors. For instance, while greater patent
strength may stimulate R&D in innovative industries, higher marginal innovation cost and
lower fixed innovation cost can make weaker patents in such an industry more conducive
to innovation. Both the pharmaceutical industry and the IT industry may be considered
as highly dependent on innovation for growth. According to Burk and Lemley (2009),
however, patent protection is critical to innovation in the former but not in the latter.
The diﬀerent nature of innovation costs in the two industries could potentially explain the
diﬀerence.18 Thus, while diﬀerent industries and/or countries may desire diﬀerent patent
strength to stimulate innovation , the proper formulation of patent policy will require careful
considerations of multiple factors.
For tractability, we have studied a stylized model that abstracts from many other consid-
erations. For instance, there may be more than one entrant competing for a new discovery
18 In revisiting the patent paradox in the semiconductor industry in which there was a high patenting
propensity even though it apppeared that patents were among the least eﬀective mechanism for appropriating
R&D returns, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) found that “...firms appear to be engaged in ‘patent portfolio races’
aimed at...negotiating access to external technologies on more favorable terms" (page 104). Bessen and
Hunt (2007) obtained a similar finding by examining patenting behavior in software industry. These findings
suggest that the profit division eﬀect is important in these industries.
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in the market; the incumbent, unlike being passive as in our model, may also actively in-
novate; innovation (ideas) may arrive randomly and can be implemented with some costs,
as, for example, in O’Donoghue et al (1998) and Hunt (2004). While we expect that the
qualitative nature of our results will continue to hold in more general settings, it would be
desirable in future research to formally consider these and other potential extensions.19
Our theoretical results have potential empirical implications. For example, to the extent
that frequent innovation is implied by a high discount factor in our dynamic model, our
finding suggests that stronger patents stimulate R&D in countries with more frequent inno-
vations; and, to the extent that capital-intensive industries have high fixed innovation costs,
our finding also suggests that stronger patents stimulate R&D in more capital-intensive in-
dustries. While these are consistent with evidence from a number of existing cross-country
and cross-industry studies, it would be interesting to develop new empirical studies in which
these and other empirical implications of our analysis can be systematically evaluated.
APPENDIX
This appendix contains proofs for Propositions 1, 3, and 4.
Proof of Proposition 1. First, from (8),  R 0 when
 Q 1− Σ0Σ +

1− 
∙
+ (1− ) 
0
0Σ
¸
≡  ( )  (12)
Since
2
2 = −
2 (1− )0Σ
1−  + 2 +
[(1− ) (1− ) + ]00Σ +  (1− )00
1−  + 2  0
the solution of  =  ( )  if it exists, implies a maximum value of  . We investigate the
19For the purpose of this paper, we have studied the eﬀects of patent protection on innovation and how
this relationship varies with industry characteristics. It would be desirable in future research to further
consider the welfare eﬀects of patent policy.
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situation where the solution of  =  ( ) lies in [0 1] 
Note that   0 Moreover,  ( )  1 if  = 0 and  ( ) → ∞ if  → 1 Since
 ( ) is continuous in  ∈ (0 1)  we can find a non-empty set  () such that, for any
given  ∈  (), there exists  ∈ (0 1) for which  ( ) =  Define ¯ = max {} ∈
(0 1) Then, if   ¯ for all  ∈ [0 1]  we have  ( )  , implying   0
Next, when  = 0 since 0  1− Σ(0)0Σ(0) and
Σ()0Σ() increases in  there exists a unique ∗
with ∗ =  (∗ 0) such that  S  ( 0) when  S ∗ or  R 0 when  Q ∗
Finally, for any 0   ≤ ¯ there exists ∗ () ∈ (0 1) that solves  =  ( )  Because
2
2  0 ∗ () is unique and  R 0 for  Q ∗ ()  Moreover, since
2
 =
(1− )0 + 2Σ +  (2− 1)0Σ
(2−  + 1)2  0 (13)
∗ () increases in . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. When  ()  3 ,  =  ()−  , and Σ =  ()+∆−  . Thus,
from (8),
(1−  + 2)  = − (1− ) [ () +∆−  ] + [1−  (1− )] 
0 ()  (14)
Therefore,  increases in  and is concave with respect to  It follows that ∗ increases
in  
When  ()  3   () +∆,  = [ () +  ]2  (8) and Σ =  () +∆−   Thus,
(1−  + 2) 
= − (1− ) [ () +∆−  ] + [(1− ) (1− ) + ] 0 () +  (1− ) [ () +  ] 
0 ()
4 
To show ∗ increases (decreases), it suﬃces to show that  increases (decreases).
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
 increases in  if
(1− )−  (1− )  () 
0 ()
42  (1− )−
 (1− ) 30 ()
42 ≥ 0
or  ≤ 44+3(1−)0() ≡ 1 And,  decreases in  if
(1− )−  (1− )  () 
0 ()
42  (1− )−
 (1− ) (3 −∆) 0 ()
42 ≤ 0
or  ≥ 42
42+(1−)(3−∆)0() ≡ 2Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. (1) When 3   (), substituting  =  () −  and Σ =
 () +∆−  into (10) and rearranging the terms, we obtain
3
2
1 (∗)2 + [1 (1− )− ∆]∗ = (1− ) (1− ) [ () +∆−  ] +  [ ()−  +]  (15)
Therefore
∗
 =
[(1− ) (1− ) + ] 0 ()− (1− ) [ () +∆−  ]
31∗ + 1 (1− )− ∆  (16)
The innovation-maximizing patent protection, ∗ satisfies
[(1− ) (1− ) + ] 0 ()− (1− ) [ () +∆−  ] = 0
which is independent of ∗ 1 and It follows that in this case ∗1 = 0 and ∗ =
0
(2) When  () ≤ 3   ()+∆, we have  = [ () +  ]2  (8) and Σ =  ()+∆−  
Thus ∗ satisfies
3
2
1 (∗)2 +
"
1 (1− )−  [ () +∆−  ] +  [ () +  ]
2
8
#
∗
= (1− ) (1− ) [ () +∆−  ] + 
"
 + [ () +  ]
2
8
#
. (17)
19
Diﬀerentiating (17) with respect to  we obtain the condition for ∗:
∙
(1− ) (1− ) +  ( () + ) + 
∗ (3 −  ())
4
¸
0 ()− (1− ) [ () +∆−  ] = 0 (18)
Hence
∗
1 =
∗
1
0(∗)[3−(∗)]
4
Ω 
∗
 =
∗

0(∗)[3−(∗)]
4
Ω 
where
Ω ≡
"
2 (1− ) +  (
∗ − 1) 0 (∗)
4
#
0 (∗)
−
∙
(1− ) (1− ∗) +  [ (
∗) +  ]
4 +
∗ [3 −  (∗)]
4
¸
00 (∗)
 0
if
00 (∗)
0 (∗) 
8 (1− )  +  (∗ − 1) 0 (∗)
4 (1− ) (1− ∗)  +  [ (∗) +  ] + ∗ [3 −  (∗)] 
which holds if (11) is satisfied.
Meanwhile, (17) implies
∗
1 = −
3
2 (∗)2 + (1− )∗
31∗ + 1 (1− )−  [ () +∆−  ] + [()+ ]28

∗
 =

31∗ + 1 (1− )−  [ () +∆−  ] + [()+ ]28
.
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But
31∗ + 1 (1− )−  [ () +∆−  ] +  [ () +  ]
2
8
 3
2
1∗ + 1 (1− )−  [ () +∆−  ] +  [ () +  ]
2
8
=
(1− ) (1− ) [ () +∆−  ] + 
h
 + [()+ ]28
i
∗  0
where the equality is due to (17). Thus ∗1  0 and 
∗
  0 Furthermore, 
0
(∗)[3−(∗)]
4 
0 It follows that ∗1  0 and 
∗
  0. Q.E.D.
21
REFERENCES
[1] Aghion, P., N. Bloom, R. Blundell, R. Griﬃth, and P. Howitt, 2005, “Competition and
Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 701 -
728.
[2] Bessen, J and R. M. Hunt, 2007, “An Empirical Look at Software Patents”, Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy, 16, 157-189.
[3] Bessen, J. and E. Maskin, 2009, “Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation”, RAND
Journal of Economics, 31, 611-635.
[4] Burk, D., and M. Lemley, 2009, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
[5] Chang, H., 1995, “Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy and Cumulative Innovation”, RAND
Journal of Economics, 26, 34-57.
[6] Chen, Y. and T. Puttitanun, 2005, “Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation in Devel-
oping Countries,” Journal of Development Economics, 78, 474-493.
[7] Chin, J. and G. Grossman, 1990, "Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade",
R.W. Jones, A. Krueger, Editors, The Political Economy of International Trade Essays
in Honor of Robert E. Baldwin, Blackwell, Cambridge, MA
[8] Denicolò, V., 2000, “Two-stage Patent Races and Patent Policy”, RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 31, 488-501.
[9] Denicolò, V. and P. Zanchettin, 2002, “How Should Forward Patent Protection Be Pro-
vided?” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, 801-827.
[10] Gallini, N., 1992, “Patent Policy and Costly Imitation”, RAND Journal of Economics, 23,
52-63.
22
[11] Gilbert, R. and C. Shapiro, 1990, “Optimal Patent Length and Breadth”, RAND Journal
of Economics, 21, 106-112.
[12] Green, J. and S. Scotchmer, 1995, “On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation”,
RAND Journal of Economics, 26, 20—33
[13] Hall, B.H. and R.H. Ziedonis, 2001, “The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study
of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979—1995”, RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 32, 101—128.
[14] Helpman, E., 1993, “Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights”, Economet-
rica, 61, 1247-1280.
[15] Hunt, Robert M., 2004, “Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation”, Journal of
Industrial Economics, 52, 401-425.
[16] Klemperer, P., 1990, “How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?” RAND
Journal of Economics, 21, 113-130.
[17] Matutes, C., P. Regibeau and K. Rockett, 1996, “Optimal Patent Design and the Diﬀusion
of Innovations”, RAND Journal of Economics, 27, 60-83.
[18] O’Donoghue, Ted, 1998, “A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Innovation”, RAND
Journal of Economics, 29, 654-679.
[19] O’Donoghue, Ted, Suzanne Scotchmer, and Jacques-Francois Thisse, 1998, “Patent
Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress”, Journal of Economics
and Management Strategy, 7, 1-32.
[20] Park, W., 2005, “Do Intellectual Property Rights Stimulate R&D and Productivity Growth?
Evidence from Cross-National and Manufacturing Industries Data”, in J. Putnam (ed.),
Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Calgary:
University of Calgary Press.
23
[21] Park, W. and J. Ginarte, 1997, “Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth”,
Contemporary Economic Policy, 15, 51-61.
[22] Qian, Y., 2007, “Do National Patent Laws Stimulate Domestic Innovation in a Global
Patenting Environment? A Cross-country Analysis of Pharmaceutical Patent Protec-
tion, 1978—2002”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 89, 436-453.
[23] Scotchmer, S., 1996, “Protecting Early Innovators: Should Second-Generation Products be
Patentable?” RAND Journal of Economics, 27, 322-331.
[24] Scotchmer, S., 2004, Innovation and Incentives, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
[25] Segal, I., and M. Whinston, 2007, “Antitrust in Innovative Industries”, American Economic
Review, 97, 1703-1730.
[26] Van Dijk, T., 1996, “Patent Height and Competition in Product Improvements”, Journal
of Industrial Economics, 44, 151-167.
[27] Vickers, J., 2010, “Competition Policy and Property Rights”, Economic Journal, 120, 375-
392.
24
